<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>FIDO2 on Research Logs</title><link>https://williamresearch.com/tags/fido2/</link><description>Recent content in FIDO2 on Research Logs</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-US</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 10:00:00 +0700</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://williamresearch.com/tags/fido2/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>When an AI Account Becomes a Security Principal</title><link>https://williamresearch.com/posts/ai-account-security-physical-keys/</link><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 10:00:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>https://williamresearch.com/posts/ai-account-security-physical-keys/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="the-problem-starts-after-the-successful-login"&gt;The problem starts after the successful login&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Imagine opening an AI account on a laptop, touching a security key, and passing the sign-in check. The account is now ready to search files, use connected applications, retain memory, and let an agent act on the user&amp;rsquo;s behalf. The login was correct. That still does not answer whether the next action should run.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the practical gap behind the current interest in physical security keys. A key can make it much harder for a phishing site to impersonate the account owner at sign-in. It cannot tell whether the device is healthy, whether a session was stolen later, whether a connected application is trustworthy, or whether an agent&amp;rsquo;s requested action is appropriate for the resource.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>